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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BENNY CRUZ, I Appellant, 
vs. 
DEPART~IEN'l' OF EJ\IPLOY- c:~~i!0• 
MEN'f SECURITY AND BOARD ) 
OF REVIEW OF TlIE INDGS-
TRIAL COl\11\IISSION OF UTAH, 
Respondents . . 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
ST ATEMEN'f OF CASE 
Petition for review challenging the Department of 
Employment Security as affirmed by the Appeals 
Referee and the Board of Review of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah holding appellant, Benny Cruz, 
to be disqualified from receiving unemployment com-
pensation benefits under Section 35-4-5 ( d) UCA, 1953, 
by reason of the fact that he was involved in a strike at 
the time of his application for benefits. 
1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the decision of the 
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Board of Review and an order granting Appellant Ult· 
employment compensation benefits. 
STATEl\iENT OF .FACTS 
The Appellant was employed by Kennecott Copper 
Corporation on February 24, 1955, as heavy dutv 
equipment operator and was so employed on July lj, 
1967, when his work ceased due to a strike at that corpo-
ration. He was a member of Operating Engineers Lo· 
cal #3 and as a member, he honored the picket line. 
During the strike he did not at any time contact the 
company to go to work. ( TR-0022) . The Appellant had 
a supplemental job working for Pioneer Sand and 
Gravel Company which began on April 20, 1967 and 
ended on December 20, 1967, when he was laid off due 
to weather conditions. ( TR-0020) ( TR-0024). He did 
not quit his job with Kennecott Copper Corporation 
and during the strike he maintained his union member· 
ship, seniority rights, and other benefits. (TR-0026). 
In order to maintain his group insurance he had to pay 
the premiums during the strike. ( TR-0028) . He ex· 
pected to be called back after the strike was settled; and 
he was called back, and he returned to work on March 
31, 1968. (TR-0023) (TR-0025). 
His work with Pioneer Sand and Gravel was es· 
sentially seasonal. He testified that he planned to re· 
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turn to work there "as soon as it dries out enough to be 
able to work the ground ... " ( TR-0024). His work with 
the company was that of operating bulldozers. (TH-
0021). His base pay with Kennecott was $24.36 per 
r•ight-hour day plus fringe benefits, plus time and one-
half for the sixth day of work. At Pioneer his base pay 
was $3.00 per hour with no fringe benefits and straight 
time when he worked over 40 hours per week. (TR-
0023). 
When he was laid off due to weather conditions by 
Pioneer, he filed a claim for unemployment compensa-
tion benefits and the Department determined that he 
was unemployed due to the stoppage of work which 
existed because of the strike. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. THE DECISION IS CONSISTENT 
WITH THE PURPOSE AND POLICY OF 
THE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT. 
2. APPELLANT WAS AN E.MPLOYEE 
OF KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION 
DURING THE ENTIRE PERIOD OF THE 
STRIKE. 
3. HE 'VAS UNElHPLOYED DUE TO THE 
STOPPAGE OF WORK 'VHICH EXISTED 





THE DECISION IS CONSISTENT WITH 
THE PURPOSE AND POLICY O.F THE EM. 
PLOY.NIENT SECURITY ACT. 
The Utah Employment Security Act was adopted 
in recognition that: 
"35-4-2 .... Economic insecurity due to un-
employment is a serious menace to the health, 
morals, and welfare of the people of this state. 
Unemployment is therefore a subject of genml 
interest and concern which requires appropriate 
action by the Legislature to prevent its spread 
and to lighten its burden which now so often 
falls with crushing force upon the unemployed 
worker and his family. The achievement of social 
security requires protection against this greatest 
hazard of our economic life. This objective can 
be furthered by operating free public employ· 
ment offices in affiliation with a nationwide sys· 
tern of employment services, by devising appro· 
priate methods for reducing the volume of un· 
employment and by the systematic accumulation 
of funds during periods of employment from 
which benefits may be paid for periods of un· 
employment, thus maintaining purchasing power 
and limiting the serious social consequences of 
unemployment. The Legislature, therefore, d~­
clares that in its considered judgment the public 
good, and the general welfare of the. citizens of 
this state require the enactment of this measure. 
under the police power of the state, for the estab-
lishment and maintenance of free public employ-
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ment offices and for the compulsory setting aside 
of unemployment i:eserves to be used for the 
benefit of unemployed persons." 
The Legislature recognized that certain unemploy-
ments arise by reason of voluntary acts of individuals 
and that, therefore, disqualifications should be assessed. 
Section 35-4-5 was enacted to establish conditions of in-
eligibility in cases of voluntarily leaving work, discharge 
for misconduct, failure to apply for or accept suitable 
work, and for individuals who became unemployed due 
to stoppages of work which existed because of strikes. 
Section 35-4-5 ( d) provides: 
"An individual shall be ineligible for benefits 
or for purposes of establishing a waiting period: 
"(d) For any week in which it is found by the 
commission that his unemployment is due to a 
stoppage of work which exists because of a strike 
involving his grade, class, or group of workers 
at the factory or establishment at which he is or 
w~ last employed." (Emphasis added.) 
The Court's attention is called to the fact that the 
Appellant, on Page 50 of his brief, misquotes the sec-
tion by leaving out the word "is" in the last line thereof. 
This same omission occurs when the Appellant refers to 
the statutes applicable to the Bruley case. 
This Court in the case of Gus P. Lexes, et al vs. 
The Industrial Commission of the State of Utah, De-
partment of Employment Security, and American 
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Smelting and Refining Company, 121 Ut. 551, 243 p ·. 
2d 964, said: , : 
"The 'Utah Unemployment Reserve Law' a~][ : 
was first known was enacted in 1953, Chapter 38 ' 
Laws of Utah 1935. Section 1 declared that th~ 
policy of the act was to lessen the burden of in· 
voluntary employment 'which now so often falls 
with crushing force upon the unemployed worker : 
and his family.' The act was designed to establish • 
'financial reserves for the benefit of persons un. · 
employed through no fault of their own.' At that 
time this nation was in the throes of a great eco-
nomic depression. The purpose of providing un- • 
employment benefits was twofold: first, to allevi· · 
ate the need of the worker and his family who 
found no market for their services and were de· 
prived of wages by the general business collapse; 
second, it was a 'pump-priming' measure to pro· 
vide increased buying power and thereby stimu· 
late our economic system. In present times of , 
prosperity, neither of these objectives would be 
served by granting benefits to the present claim· 
ants. Future times may present occasions when 
the cushioning effect of unemployment compen· 
sation may arrest the course of a narrowing down· 
ward economic spiral so as to make pump-priming 
in its raw form unnecessary. Labor's right to seek 
higher wages by concerted lawful economic pr~s­
sure is recognized but the labor force which 
chooses to strike in order to enforce its demands 
cannot be classified as involuntarily unemployed. 
It is specifically disqualified from receiving com· 
pensation by statute. Those who are in sympath~: 
with the striking body and stay away from then 
available jobs in order to uphold the reciproc~l 
pact amongst laboring forces to honor each others 
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picket lines cannot logically be placed in any 
other category. "\Ve believe that consideration of 
the background and general purpose of unem-
ployment legislation is what has prompted the 
courts to hold that the decision of an employee 
not to cross a picket line which surrounds his 
place of work cannot be deemed an involuntary 
act." 
It appears clear that it is the policy of the Act to 
rleny benefits to an individual who remains attached to 
an employer where there is a stoppage of work due to a 
strike in which the individual is directly involved. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT WAS AN EMPLOYEE OF 
KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION DUR-
1 ING THE ENTIRE PERIOD OF THE 
STRIKE. 
Section 35-4-5 ( d), supra, denies benefits to the 
individual with respect to any week during which he is 
i still employed by a struck employer where he is involved 
1 in the strike. 
The first question that arises is whether or not one 
who is on strike is no longer to be considered an employee 
of the struck employer. The authorities appear to be 
quite unanimous that the relation of employee and em-
ployer is not terminated by reason of the strike. 
In Jeffery-De,Vitt Insulator Co. vs. National La-
7 
bor Relations Bd., 91 F. 2d 134 ( 4 Cir., 1937), 11 ~ 
A.L.R. 948, the court stated: 
'·It h~s loug been rec:ognized by the law, a~ 
well as m c:ommon understanding, that the rela-
~ionship existin.g betwe~n employer and employee 
1s not nec:essanly tenmnated by a strike. As wa~ 
well said by Judge Baker, speaking for the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit in 
:Michaelson vs. Cnited States, 291 F. 940, 914~: 
'In the case of a controversy over wages and con-
ditions of work in a private and local industry we 
agree with counsel for plaintiffs in error that a 
"strike" does not of itself terminate the relatiou 
of employer and employee. A controversy arises, 
and the employees, then at work, say to their em-
ployer: "'Ve shall stop work until you are in what 
we may consider a more reasonable state of mind. 
'ye shall deprive you of our labor as a legitimate 
means of exerting economic pressure to induce 
you to yield. If we do go out, we shall remain at 
hand, ready to negotiate with you concerning 
fair wages and working rules, and ready to re· 
turn to work the moment we can agree." If, by 
reason of a failure to agree, the employees stop 
their work, a "strike" is on. They are no longer 
working and receiYing wages: but, in the absence 
of anv action other than above indicated looking 
to a termination of the relationship, they are en· 
titled to rank as "employees." with the adj~ctire 
"striking" defining their immediate status. 
* * * 
"In State ,·s. Personett, 114 Kan. 680, 220 P . 
.;90 .;9 i in sustainino· a conviction under the ...,_ ,. v--±', ~ ~ -.., t 
Kansas Industrial Court Act. the Supreme l ll~Jl' 
of that state said: 'It may be noted that a strike 
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1s not a quitting of employment. The man who 
goes out on a strike does not profess to quit his 
employment. He still lays claim to his position 
and asserts a right to go back and take it at more 
adnmtageous terms.'" 
See also Iron )loulder's Union vs. Allis-Chalmers Co. 
\C.C.A. 7th) 166 F. 45, 52, 20 L.R.A. (N.S.) 315; 
Tri-City Central Trades Council vs. American Steel 
Foundries ( C.C.A. 7th) 238 F. 728, 733; Dail-Over-
land Co. vs. "'"illys-Overland, Inc. (D.C.) 263 F. 171, 
188. 
In Burger vs. Unemployment Compensation Board 
of Rev., 168 Pa. Super. 89, 77 A. 2d 737, the Court said: 
""'"here there is a labor dispute, whether it 
takes the form of a strike or a lock-out, the rela-
tion of employer and employee is not severed, but 
continues until the dispute is settled or until the 
employee secures other employment." 
POINT III 
HE \VAS UNE~1PLOYED DUE TO THE 
STOPPAGE OF \VORK WHICH EXISTED 
BECACSE OF THE STRIKE IN WHICH HE 
WAS INVOLVED. 
Since the strike does not terminate the relation of 
employer-employee, we go to the next question, does the 
continuance or the taking of other employment after 
the beginning of the stoppage of work which exists be-
cause of the strike dissolve the employer-employee re-
lationship? 
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This Court has not passed on the specific question 
of the effect of supplemental or intervening employment 
on the matter of the claimant's eligibility for unemplor-
ment compensation benefits. From the following cas~s 
it appears to be the general rule that mere evidence of 
supplemental or intervening employment subsequent to 
the strike, standing alone is not sufficient. The burden 
of establishing Appellant's eligibility for unemployment 
compensation benefits rests upon him. 
The landmark case appears to be Hopkins vs. Cali-
fornia Employment Com., 24 Cal. 2d 744, 151 P. 2d 
299, 154 A.L.R. 1081 Annot., decided in 1944. There 
the court stated: 
"Section 56 (a) of the California U nemploy· 
ment Insurance Act, under which claimants were 
originally disqualified, provides that 'An indi-
vidual is not eligible for benefits for unemploy-
ment, and no such benefit shall be payable to 
him * * * (a) If he left his work because of a 
trade dispute and for the period during which he 
continues out of work by reason of the fact that 
the trade dispute is still in active progress in the 
establishment in which he was employed. Stats. 
1939, ch 7, Sec. 4, Deering's Gen. Laws, 1939 
Supp. Act 8780d, Sec. 56 (a) . A claimant is thus 
ineligible for benefits if the trade dispute is the 
direct cause of his continuing out of work. If a 
claimant who leaves his work because of a trade 
dispute subsequently obtains a permanent full-
time job, however, he is no longer out ~f work 
and the continuity of his unemployment 1s brok· 
en. If he loses his new job for reasons unrelated 
to the dispute, he is unemployed by reason, not 
10 
of the trade dispute, but of the loss of the new 
employment .... 
"The termination of a claimant's disqualifica-
tion by subsequent employment thus depends on 
whether it breaks the continuity of the claimant's 
unemployment and the causal connection between 
his unemployment and the trade dispute. Such 
employment must be bona fide and not a device 
to circumvent the statute .. [Citing cases.} 
"It must sever completely the relation between 
the striking employee and his former employer. 
The strike itself simply suspends the employer-
employee relationship but does not terminate it. 
[Citing cases.] Mere temporary or casual work 
does not sever this relationship for it does not 
effectively replace the former employment. The 
worker expects its termination and does not look 
forward to that continuity of work and income 
that characterizes permanent employment. [Cit-
ing cases.] Similarly, part-time employment of 
a claimant does not break the casual relation be-
tween the trade dispute and his unemployment. 
[Citing cases.] Only permanent full-time em-
ployment can terminate the disqualification. If 
bona fide, it completely replaces the claimant's 
former employment, terminating whatever re-
lation existed between the claimant and his 
former employer. It must be judged prospective-
ly rather than retrospectively, with regard to the 
character of the employment, how it was obtained, 
and whether it was in the regular course of the 
employer's business and the customary occupa-
tion of the claimant. [Citing cases.] In the ab-
sence of special circumstances, employment of a 
short duration admits of an inference that it was 
11 
not entered into in good faith with the intent 
that it be permanent. 
* * * 
"In the remaining cases the commission could 
not ~easonably conclude that the claimants had 
obtamed permanent full-time employment and 
had completely severed their relations with their 
former employers. The undisputed evidence 
shows that the work secured by the claimants 
during the hotel strike was stop-gap employment 
and that the claimants had not forf.~ited their em-
ployment in the struck establishments." 
In 1960 the matter was before the Pennsylvania 
court in Oluschak vs. Unemployment Compensation Bd. 
of Review, 192 Pa. Super. 255, 159 A. 2d 750, and we 
quote from their opinion: 
" ... The record indicates that the claimant 
while on strike at Westinghouse, sought and ob· 
tained employment at H. W. Butterworth & 
Sons, Philmont Road, Bethayers, Pa. The em· 
ployment began on October 23, 1955, and ended 
by lay-off on March 9, 1956. Ile did not at any 
time sever his employment or resign from the job 
at Westinghouse nor did he give to his employer 
or anyone else any indication of an intention so 
to do. He testified that the new job paid $1.7J 
per hour plus bonus, on piece work, and his job 
at \Vestinghouse paid, prior to the strike, $2.10\; 
cents per hour; that it was similar work; that I 
said I would stay if the job was dependable be· 
cause with the bonus, it would be the same as I 
was getting and I said if I made out, I would 
stay there'; and that he joined the union but con· 
tinued his membership in the \Vestinghouse 
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union. He remained on the Westinghouse pay-
roll as one of the striking employees, with all the 
benefits of fifteen years seniority, insurance and 
other incidents of that employment. After said 
strike, he was recalled, and with other employees 
of 'Vestinghouse received the additional benefits 
won by the strike. 
* * * 
"The burden was upon the claimant to prove 
he was entitled to unemployment compensation 
benefits. Smith Unemployment Compensation 
Case, 1950, 167 Pa. Super, 242, 74 A. 2d 523. An 
unemployed person because of a labor dispute, 
can only recoyer unemployment compensation 
when he can prove that he is not directly inter-
ested, and that he is not a member of the striking 
union and that he is not in the same grade or class 
of workers as the strikers. Curcio Unemployment 
Compensation Case, supra; Stahlman Unemploy-
ment Compensation Case, 1958, 187 Pa. Super, 
246, 144 A. 2d 670. In this case the claimant must 
establish, that although at the time of the strike 
he was disqualified under Section 402 ( d), he 
now comes within subsections ( 1) , ( 2) and ( 3) , 
by showing he obtained a new job and severed his 
employment with 'V estinghouse. The evidence 
of an intervening job, standing alone, is not suf-
ficient. Such a job could be stop-gap, part-time 
or temporary employment accepted during the 
strike for economic reasons. The claimant could 
continue to be 'participating in, or directly inter-
ested in, the labor dispute which caused the stop-
page of work' and could still be "a member of an 
organization which is p,;irticipating in, or directly 
interested in, the labor dispute which caused the 
stoppage of work' and could be in the same grade 
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or class of worke_rs as the st~ikers. His recall at 
the ~nd of ~he stnke by W ~stmghouse is evidenct 
of lus contmued memberslup in the union and I' 
l 
. li 
tie I~amtenance of his employee status on the 
Westmghouse payroll, from which it can be in-
ferred that he continued to be 'directly interested 
in the outcome of the labor dispute." 
The Idaho Supreme Court held in Ankrum vs. Em. 
ployment Security Agency (Idaho 1961), 361 P. ~<l 
795, that the burden is upon a claimant to establish his 
eligibility for benefits whenever his claim therefor i1 
questioned. 
When Appellant was laid off by the Pioneer Sand 
and Gravel Company, he continued to be unemployed 
solely by reason of the strike in which he was involved 
and through which he hoped to receive higher pay and 
other benefits. He stood ready to return to Kennecott 
whether or not he was working for Pioneer when the 
strike ended. He recognized that he had an employee 
relationship with Kennecott and retained his seniority 
rights. ( TR-0025) . Appellant obtained his job with 
Pioneer in 1966 while working for Kennecott. He was 
impelled to work the two jobs concurrently with the 
Pioneer job supplementing his Kennecott job because 
of extensive medical and therapeutic expenses being con· 
tinuously incurred in connection with a son's illness, 
( TR-0025) . He said, "And this is my reason for having 
worked these jobs." In the cases discussed above, the 
courts were looking to see what effects intervening. 
supplemental, or stop-gap employment had on the in· 
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lentions of the claimant with reference to his claim for 
unemployment compensation benefits. In other words, 
did the claimant or the claimants intend to substitute 
the new employment for the "struck" employment? 
In Calvin B. Scott vs. UCC, and Anaconda Co., 
141 Mont. 230, 376 P. 2d 733, decided under identical 
statutory provisions, the court examined the leading 
cases in the several states including a number of those 
cited by Respondent and concluded: 
"l. The burden is upon claimant to show he is 
not disqualified. 
"2. The taking of other employment by a claim-
ant while on strike, standing alone, is not suffi-
cient to establish that burden. 
"3. The new employment must not be of the 
stop-gap, part-time or temporary type, but rather 
of the permanent full-time type without inten-
tion of returning to the struck employer at the 
termination of the strike. 
"4. The new employment must have been un-
dertaken in good faith and be of the type former-
ly engaged in by the employee or for which he 
would be skilled and competent. 
"5. There must exist a complete and bona fide 
severance of his employment with the struck em-
ployer." 
In the Scott case, supra, all of the claimants were 
members of the union that called the strike with the em-
ployer and caused their unemployment; each found some 
form of new employment during the course of the strike 
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and then, upon losing or quitting same before the en<l 
of the strike, filed for benefits. All responded to notices 
of recall at the conclusion of the dispute. The decision of 
the court was that: 
"A strike does not sever the employer-employet 
relationship. The burden of showing that this 
relationship is severed by new employment is 
upon the claimant. At best, claimants evidenced 
reluctance to quit or renounce their seniority 
rights with the struck employer and most admit-
ted that they viewed their new work as stop-gap 
employment and that they did return at the end 
of the strike. Therefore, .under the substantial· 
evidence rule, the lower courts were without 
authority to reverse the benefit denials imposed 
by the Commission." 
In the instant case, the Appellant testified that he 
considered himself to be an employee of Kennecott 
Copper Corporation all during the period of the strike 
and that he retained his several rights as an employee of 
Kennecott. It is very clear from the record that his em· 
ployment with Pioneer Sand and Gravel Company wa~ 
secured in order to supplement and not be a substitute 
for his employment with Kennecott. There is only one 
reason why the claimant was unemployed and continued 
to be unemployed after he was laid off by Pioneer Sand 
and Gravel and that reason was that the claimant, his 
union and other unions, were involved in a strike at Ken· 
necott Copper Corporation which brought about a stop-
page of work. In the Scott case, supra, the court said: 
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"Having reviewed the records before us of the 
various claimants, it appears that in no case did 
the claimant sustain his burden of proving he was 
not disqualified, and in no case did a claimant 
show a complete and bona fide severance of his 
employment ~ith the struck employer. 
"Further, no claimant proved that he had no 
intention of returning for work for the struck 
employer at the termination of the strike." 
The Appellant, in his brief, relies strongly on the 
case of Bruley vs. Industrial Commission, 101 So. 2d 22 
(Fla.) . In the Bruley case, supra, the court stated: 
"The facts upon which the matter was deter-
mined are simple. Appellant was employed as a 
bartender, at the Roney Plaza Hotel in :Miami 
Beach, for approximately a year and a half be-
fore a strike which began in April of 1955. He 
quit his job and participated in the strike, and 
was paid strike benefits for a number of weeks. 
"In December of the year he became employed 
on a regular basis as bartender in another hotel 
called the Blue Waters Hotel. He continued to 
work at the Blue 'Vaters Hotel until he was dis-
charged nine months later. It was following his 
discharge from that last employment that he 
made application for the unemployment compen-
sation which was denied him. 
* * * 
''"\Vhether such subsequent employment is to 
be regarded as 'stop-gap' in the sense in which 
that term is used by the commission, is one which 
can vary from case to case, depending on the facts 
of each case. The length or brevity of the subse-
17 
9~ent employme_nt may have a bearing. Basica]], 
it is a matter of mtent and good faith. l 
"If the new employme:qt is undertaken in good r 
faith, and with intent on the part of the employee , 
to continue therein on a permanent basis or for 
an indefinite period, he will have insulated him. 
self against the 'cause' of unemployment which 
he suffered initially as a result of the labor dis-
pute at the place of prior employment." 
In the Scott vs. UCC case, supra, the court in re· 
ferring to the Bruley case, supra, stated: 
". . . The court from the record before it felt 
the work was 'new employment; entered in good 
faith and regarded by the employee as being per-
manent or for an indefinite period." 
The Court stated further: 
"It will readily be seen that none of these cases" 
(ref erring to the Bruley case and others) "de· 
viate from the principles we have heretofore out· 
lined ... " 
The principles referred to were those cited earlier 
in this brief by the court in the Scott case. 
In the Bruley case, supra, the court found that a! 
a matter of fact, the claimant had obtained new work 
and had no intention of relying on the struck employer 
in the future unless perhaps he lost his second employ-
ment. In the instant case, we have no such factual situ· 
ation. From the record and the testimony, it is clear that 
the Appellant considered his employment with Pioneer 
as secondary and supplemental and he considered him· 1 
I 
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self to be a regular permanent employee of Kennecott 
Copper Corporation. 
Therefore, it is clear that the Department, as af-
firmed by the Board of Review, had no choice in view 
of the obvious intentions of Appellant but to deny bene-
fits on the grounds that the Appellant was, at the time 
he filed his claims for unemployment compensation 
benefits, an employee of Kennecott Copper Corpora-
tion and that the only reason he was unemployed was 
because there was a stoppage of work due to a strike in 
which he was involved. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the Board of Review of the Indus-
trial Commission denying unemployment compensation 
to the Appellant was founded upon substantial evidence 
and its decision should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENTS: 
Vernon B. Romney 
Attorney General 
Fred F. Dremann, Special 
Assistant Attorney General 
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